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+internal/access/ repo visibility + share-grant policy (imports no core)

+internal/authn/ login/logout endpoints

+internal/httpx/ shared admin/share HTTP security helpers

+internal/site/ the route table and route-specific request parsers

+**`internal/access`** owns the rule for whether an identity may view or

+share a repo. It deliberately imports nothing from `core`, so the 404 gate,

+the index module, share minting and share redemption all call the same

+policy. Do not grow a second visibility check elsewhere.

+

+everything together. If the route needs a new path grammar, declare a

+`Route.Request` parser in `internal/site`; core still resolves every ref it

+returns. Pagination is declared with `Route.PageSize`.

+# My git viewer

+

+### Why I did this

+

+So, the premise behind this project was a few different things:

+

+- I wanted a git viewer stack that, while modular, remained light.

+- I liked the idea of having reusable "templates" rather than generating the HTML dynamically in the code. This is much closer to how things like Hugo operate.

+- It needs to be easy to extend (modularity!). A core is responsible for loading a git repo's context and other request state, but all "real" functionality is implemented via modules. I could add/remove things without needing to worry (too much...) about breaking unrelated things.

+- I wanted something that was modern, but didn't require javascript to operate. All features on this site work without javascript, though your experience is improved with it.

+- I wanted to have a way to view private git repositories using systems I already have.

+ - I don't want to/have the capability to SSH clone my repos to show something off.

+ - Could I have done this in cgit? Perhaps, but it wasn't built for it.

+- And, probably most visibly, this was a trial in "vibe coding". While the idea around the design of this software was mine, I wrote very little of the code. Especially the UI, and this is for the better. I am not a graphics designer and whatever slop the LLM pumps out (with my input here and there) will be leagues better than whatever I do; for better or worse.

+

+The name "gsg" doesn't mean much (I don't name things). It're pretty much "git static generator". It was the placeholder when I was thinking of a system that was "kind of a combination of cgit's lightness and hugo's composability and templating".

+

+### The design

+

+First and foremost, the AI writeup is in ./llm_readme.md. Read that if you want all of the verbose details.

+

+Also, as alluded to above, no javascript is strictly required. The few places it is used it is just used to make the experience nicer, and a fallback always exists. For example, the JSON/YAML codepath has a JS module that allows you to search for values/keys, perform folding, etc. This is a core design tenant: JS always hydrates what exists already.

+

+(Not) Broadly speaking, as stated above, this project is split up into:

+

+- The core

+ - gitx - the module that actually interfaces with git. This transforms a context into a re-usable struct (should I ever want to use a real implementation)

+ - access - Consolidated checks for whether someone can see/not see a repo

+ - session - Owns all privileged access logic. It generates/verifies tokens that are used across the site. Everything is stateless once authenticated.

+ - authn - Route owner that defines login/logout flows. Uses session internally

+ - httpx - Shared helpers used when generating responses/evaling a req

+ - notices - Logic for me to post notices to the site or repos

+ - share - Logic for authenticated users to mint links to private repos they are allowed to. Uses same auth logic as users under the hood.

+ - api - Exposes repo details as a JSON endpoint, will be used by my main site later on

+ - core/site - All the main things needed to make this tick. Build req context, define routes and where they live, define module registration structs.

+- The modules

+ - blob - Responsible for returning files (raw or templated)

+ - commit - Render a commit

+ - compare - Render a diff between two commits/refs

+ - graph - Render commit log graph

+ - image - Image preview, defines compatible file types and max size

+ - markdown - Render markdown

+ - readme - Inherits markdown to render a readme (what you see here!)

+ - notices - Handles cache invalidation for repos that need one rendered

+ - log - View the git log

+ - repos - Aggregates the repos you may view based on session

+ - structured - Whether a file is a YAML or JSON. If so, it prepares data for JS in the frontend to perform folding and suchA

+ - tree - the directory-structure viewer

+

+As time goes on, I am sure I will find more things to add to this. This is really meant to be a project for me, not necessarily building "the next git viewer for everyone".

+

+I figured I would upload this here in case my tokens are useful for others. Enjoy!

+// Package access holds the rules that decide who may see or share a

+// repository. It deliberately imports nothing from core: the visibility

+// rule is used by the 404 gate, the index module, share-link minting, and

+// share-link redemption, and putting it in one dependency-free place is

+// what keeps those four from drifting apart.

+package access

+

+import (

+ "strings"

+ "time"

+)

+

+// Policy is the authorization-relevant subset of a repository's config.

+// core.RepoInfo is the full config; Policy is what the rules below need.

+type Policy struct {

+ Slug string

+ Hidden bool

+ VisibleTo []string

+ ShareRevokedAfter time.Time

+}

+

+// Identity is the verified caller. SharedSlugs/SharedIssuedAt come from a

+// valid gsg_share cookie and are empty when the caller has no share grant.

+type Identity struct {

+ User string

+ SharedSlugs []string

+ SharedIssuedAt time.Time

+}

+

+// CanView reports whether id may see the repository at all. Public repos

+// are visible to everyone; a hidden repo is visible to an owner named in

+// gsg.visible-to or to an unrevoked share grant.

+func (p Policy) CanView(id Identity) bool {

+ if !p.Hidden {

+ return true

+ }

+ return p.canViewAsOwner(id.User) ||

+ (p.coversShare(id.SharedSlugs) && ShareLive(p.ShareRevokedAfter, id.SharedIssuedAt))

+}

+

+// CanShare reports whether user may mint a share link for this repository.

+// Only hidden repos are shareable (sharing a public repo would grant

+// nothing new), and only an owner may mint -- a share grant cannot be

+// amplified into a broader grant.

+func (p Policy) CanShare(user string) bool {

+ return p.Hidden && p.canViewAsOwner(user)

+}

+

+// canViewAsOwner matches gsg.visible-to case-insensitively. Anonymous

+// callers never match: "" would otherwise vacuous-match a blank entry.

+func (p Policy) canViewAsOwner(user string) bool {

+ if user == "" {

+ return false

+ }

+ for _, u := range p.VisibleTo {

+ if strings.EqualFold(u, user) {

+ return true

+ }

+ }

+ return false

+}

+

+func (p Policy) coversShare(slugs []string) bool {

+ for _, s := range slugs {

+ if s == p.Slug {

+ return true

+ }

+ }

+ return false

+}

+

+// ShareLive reports whether a grant issued at issuedAt survives a

+// repository's gsg.share-revoked-after value. A zero revokedAfter means no

+// revocation; a grant issued at or before the timestamp is revoked, which

+// is why the comparison is strict -- the operator's intent is "everything

+// issued before this moment is dead", and the two sides are second-granular.

+//

+// The free function is for callers (share redemption) that only have the

+// timestamp, not a full Policy.

+func ShareLive(revokedAfter, issuedAt time.Time) bool {

+ return revokedAfter.IsZero() || issuedAt.After(revokedAfter)

+}

+package access

+

+import (

+ "testing"

+ "time"

+)

+

+func TestCanView(t *testing.T) {

+ revoked := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)

+ granted := revoked.Add(time.Minute)

+

+ cases := []struct {

+ name string

+ p Policy

+ id Identity

+ want bool

+ }{

+ {

+ name: "public repo",

+ p: Policy{Slug: "demo"},

+ want: true,

+ },

+ {

+ name: "hidden anonymous",

+ p: Policy{Slug: "demo", Hidden: true},

+ want: false,

+ },

+ {

+ name: "hidden owner",

+ p: Policy{Slug: "demo", Hidden: true, VisibleTo: []string{"Alice"}},

+ id: Identity{User: "alice"},

+ want: true,

+ },

+ {

+ name: "hidden non-owner",

+ p: Policy{Slug: "demo", Hidden: true, VisibleTo: []string{"alice"}},

+ id: Identity{User: "bob"},

+ want: false,

+ },

+ {

+ name: "hidden share grant",

+ p: Policy{Slug: "demo", Hidden: true},

+ id: Identity{SharedSlugs: []string{"demo"}, SharedIssuedAt: granted},

+ want: true,

+ },

+ {

+ name: "share grant for another repo",

+ p: Policy{Slug: "demo", Hidden: true},

+ id: Identity{SharedSlugs: []string{"other"}, SharedIssuedAt: granted},

+ want: false,

+ },

+ {

+ name: "share grant before revocation",

+ p: Policy{Slug: "demo", Hidden: true, ShareRevokedAfter: revoked},

+ id: Identity{SharedSlugs: []string{"demo"}, SharedIssuedAt: revoked},

+ want: false,

+ },

+ {

+ name: "share grant after revocation",

+ p: Policy{Slug: "demo", Hidden: true, ShareRevokedAfter: revoked},

+ id: Identity{SharedSlugs: []string{"demo"}, SharedIssuedAt: granted},

+ want: true,

+ },

+ }

+

+ for _, tc := range cases {

+ t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {

+ if got := tc.p.CanView(tc.id); got != tc.want {

+ t.Fatalf("CanView() = %v, want %v", got, tc.want)

+ }

+ })

+ }

+}

+

+func TestCanShare(t *testing.T) {

+ p := Policy{Slug: "demo", Hidden: true, VisibleTo: []string{"alice"}}

+

+ if !p.CanShare("alice") {

+ t.Fatal("owner should be able to share a hidden repo")

+ }

+ if p.CanShare("bob") {

+ t.Fatal("non-owner should not be able to share")

+ }

+ if p.CanShare("") {

+ t.Fatal("anonymous should not be able to share")

+ }

+ if (Policy{Slug: "public", VisibleTo: []string{"alice"}}).CanShare("alice") {

+ t.Fatal("public repo should not be shareable")

+ }

+}

+

+func TestShareLive(t *testing.T) {

+ revoked := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)

+

+ if !ShareLive(time.Time{}, revoked) {

+ t.Fatal("zero revokedAfter should not revoke")

+ }

+ if ShareLive(revoked, revoked) {

+ t.Fatal("grant issued at the revocation time should be revoked")

+ }

+ if ShareLive(revoked, revoked.Add(-time.Second)) {

+ t.Fatal("grant issued before revocation should be revoked")

+ }

+ if !ShareLive(revoked, revoked.Add(time.Second)) {

+ t.Fatal("grant issued after revocation should survive")

+ }

+}

+// Package authn owns gsg's browser session endpoints. Login trusts the

+// identity header that the reverse proxy sets after forward_auth; logout

+// only clears gsg's own cookie. Keeping both here means main.go composes

+// listeners rather than implementing authentication.

+//

+// The two handlers are returned separately on purpose: login must only ever

+// be mounted on the admin listener, while logout belongs on the public one.

+// A single combined handler would make that distinction a calling

+// convention instead of a structural one.

+package authn

+

+import (

+ "fmt"

+ "net/http"

+ "net/url"

+ "strings"

+

+ "gsg/internal/session"

+)

+

+// Config is the small amount of state the session endpoints need.

+type Config struct {

+ Sessions *session.Manager

+ UserHeader string // e.g. "X-Authentik-Username"; defaults to that

+}

+

+// Handlers are mounted individually by the caller.

+type Handlers struct {

+ Login http.Handler

+ Logout http.Handler

+}

+

+// NewHandlers builds the login and logout endpoints.

+func NewHandlers(cfg Config) (Handlers, error) {

+ if cfg.Sessions == nil {

+ return Handlers{}, fmt.Errorf("authn: no session manager")

+ }

+ if cfg.UserHeader == "" {

+ cfg.UserHeader = "X-Authentik-Username"

+ }

+ return Handlers{

+ Login: http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { login(cfg, w, r) }),

+ Logout: http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { logout(cfg, w, r) }),

+ }, nil

+}

+

+// login mints a session from the proxy-supplied identity. Reaching this

+// handler at all is the authorization decision: the admin listener is the

+// only place it is mounted, and Caddy's forward_auth runs before it.

+func login(cfg Config, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

+ user := r.Header.Get(cfg.UserHeader)

+ if user == "" {

+ http.Error(w, "missing identity header", http.StatusUnauthorized)

+ return

+ }

+ http.SetCookie(w, cfg.Sessions.Issue(user))

+ http.Redirect(w, r, safeNext(r.URL.Query().Get("next")), http.StatusSeeOther)

+}

+

+// logout needs no round trip through the identity provider; it only clears

+// the cookie this process issued.

+func logout(cfg Config, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

+ http.SetCookie(w, cfg.Sessions.Clear())

+ http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)

+}

+

+// safeNext returns next if it is a same-site relative path, else "/". next

+// comes from a query parameter on a login redirect; without this check it

+// would be an open redirect (?next=https://evil.example) off a trusted

+// domain, right after proving who the user is.

+func safeNext(next string) string {

+ if next == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(next, "/") || strings.HasPrefix(next, "//") {

+ return "/"

+ }

+ if u, err := url.Parse(next); err != nil || u.Scheme != "" || u.Host != "" {

+ return "/"

+ }

+ return next

+}

+package authn

+

+import (

+ "net/http"

+ "net/http/httptest"

+ "testing"

+

+ "gsg/internal/session"

+)

+

+func TestSafeNext(t *testing.T) {

+ cases := []struct {

+ in, want string

+ }{

+ {"", "/"},

+ {"/", "/"},

+ {"/demo/", "/demo/"},

+ {"/share/new?x=1", "/share/new?x=1"},

+ {"//evil.example", "/"},

+ {"https://evil.example", "/"},

+ {"http://evil.example/path", "/"},

+ {"relative", "/"},

+ }

+ for _, tc := range cases {

+ if got := safeNext(tc.in); got != tc.want {

+ t.Errorf("safeNext(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.in, got, tc.want)

+ }

+ }

+}

+

+func TestLoginRequiresIdentityHeader(t *testing.T) {

+ h := testHandlers(t)

+ req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/auth/login", nil)

+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

+ h.Login.ServeHTTP(rec, req)

+

+ if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

+ t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusUnauthorized)

+ }

+ if cookies := rec.Result().Cookies(); len(cookies) != 0 {

+ t.Fatalf("unauthenticated login set cookies: %v", cookies)

+ }

+}

+

+func TestLoginIssuesCookieAndHonorsSafeNext(t *testing.T) {

+ h := testHandlers(t)

+ req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/auth/login?next=/demo/", nil)

+ req.Header.Set("X-Authentik-Username", "alice")

+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

+ h.Login.ServeHTTP(rec, req)

+

+ if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {

+ t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusSeeOther)

+ }

+ if got := rec.Header().Get("Location"); got != "/demo/" {

+ t.Fatalf("Location = %q, want /demo/", got)

+ }

+ cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()

+ if len(cookies) != 1 || cookies[0].Name != session.CookieName {

+ t.Fatalf("cookies = %v, want one %s cookie", cookies, session.CookieName)

+ }

+}

+

+func TestLoginRejectsOffsiteNext(t *testing.T) {

+ h := testHandlers(t)

+ req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/auth/login?next=https://evil.example/", nil)

+ req.Header.Set("X-Authentik-Username", "alice")

+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

+ h.Login.ServeHTTP(rec, req)

+

+ if got := rec.Header().Get("Location"); got != "/" {

+ t.Fatalf("Location = %q, want /", got)

+ }

+}

+

+func TestLogoutClearsCookie(t *testing.T) {

+ h := testHandlers(t)

+ req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/auth/logout", nil)

+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

+ h.Logout.ServeHTTP(rec, req)

+

+ if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {

+ t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusSeeOther)

+ }

+ if got := rec.Header().Get("Location"); got != "/" {

+ t.Fatalf("Location = %q, want /", got)

+ }

+ cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()

+ if len(cookies) != 1 || cookies[0].Name != session.CookieName {

+ t.Fatalf("cookies = %v, want one %s cookie", cookies, session.CookieName)

+ }

+ if cookies[0].MaxAge >= 0 {

+ t.Fatalf("logout cookie MaxAge = %d, want negative", cookies[0].MaxAge)

+ }

+}

+

+func testHandlers(t *testing.T) Handlers {

+ t.Helper()

+ h, err := NewHandlers(Config{Sessions: session.NewManager()})

+ if err != nil {

+ t.Fatalf("NewHandlers: %v", err)

+ }

+ return h

+}

+ "gsg/internal/access"

+// caller (Server.buildCtx) is responsible for enforcing the access policy

+// before using the result.

+// AccessPolicy is the authorization-relevant subset of RepoInfo. The rules

+// themselves live in internal/access so core, modules, share minting and

+// share redemption cannot drift into slightly different answers.

+func (info RepoInfo) AccessPolicy() access.Policy {

+ return access.Policy{

+ Slug: info.Slug,

+ Hidden: info.Hidden,

+ VisibleTo: info.VisibleTo,

+ ShareRevokedAfter: info.ShareRevokedAfter,

+ // filtered for revocation -- access.Policy applies gsg.share-revoked-after

+ // against SharedIssuedAt at the point of use, since revocation is per-repo

+ // and this Ctx may span several.

+

+ // Request, when set, parses this route's path parameters. A nil parser

+ // uses the default {rest...}/{rev} handling. Parsers only split path

+ // text into ref candidates: core still calls gitx.Repo.Resolve, so user

+ // input never reaches git as raw ref syntax (see AGENTS invariant 1).

+ Request RequestFunc

+

+ // PageSize, when greater than zero, enables ?ofs= pagination at that

+ // page size and folds the normalized offset into Ctx.Vars["ofs"].

+ PageSize int

+}

+

+// Request is the path-derived input a route hands back to core before any

+// ref is resolved. Ref is the head commit; Range is set only for routes

+// that compare two commits.

+type Request struct {

+ Ref string

+ Path string

+ Range *Range

+// Range describes a base..head request. Ref on Request carries head.

+type Range struct {

+ Base string

+ ThreeDot bool

+}

+

+// RequestFunc parses route-specific path parameters. It must not invoke

+// git or resolve refs itself.

+type RequestFunc func(*http.Request) (Request, error)

+

+// boundary without an import cycle. Routes declare the matching PageSize,

+// and it must match the literal arg the log.html/graph.html template passes

+// to `mod "log"`/`mod "graph"`.

+ "gsg/internal/access"

+

+ "golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"

+ identity := access.Identity{User: s.Sessions.Verify(r)}

+ identity.SharedSlugs, identity.SharedIssuedAt = claims.Slugs, claims.IssuedAt()

+ c.User = identity.User

+ c.SharedSlugs, c.SharedIssuedAt = identity.SharedSlugs, identity.SharedIssuedAt

+ // resolved identity is explicitly allowed to see this one. The rule lives

+ // in internal/access so this gate, the index module and share redemption

+ // agree about owners, grants and revocation.

+ if !h.Info.AccessPolicy().CanView(identity) {

+ req, err := parseRequest(rt, repo, r)

+ if err != nil {

+ return nil, err

+ ref, path := req.Ref, req.Path

+ c.User = identity.User

+ c.SharedSlugs, c.SharedIssuedAt = identity.SharedSlugs, identity.SharedIssuedAt

+ if req.Range != nil {

+ base := req.Range.Base

+ dots := "2"

+ if req.Range.ThreeDot {

+ dots = "3"

+ }

+ if rt.PageSize > 0 {

+ ofs -= ofs % rt.PageSize // snap to a page boundary before it can become a cache key

+// parseRequest applies the route's parser, or the default {rest...}/{rev}

+// handling. Both only identify ref candidates; buildCtx below always calls

+// Repo.Resolve before anything downstream sees a commit.

+func parseRequest(rt Route, repo *gitx.Repo, r *http.Request) (Request, error) {

+ if rt.Request != nil {

+ return rt.Request(r)

+ }

+ switch {

+ case r.PathValue("rest") != "":

+ ref, path := repo.SplitRefPath(r.PathValue("rest"))

+ return Request{Ref: ref, Path: path}, nil

+ case r.PathValue("rev") != "":

+ return Request{Ref: r.PathValue("rev")}, nil

+ default:

+ return Request{Ref: repo.HeadRef()}, nil

+ }

+}

+

+// Package httpx holds small HTTP helpers shared by gsg's non-page

+// surfaces. The admin and share handlers must make the same origin,

+// scheme, header and remote-address decisions; keeping them here means a

+// security fix lands in one place instead of three.

+package httpx

+

+import (

+ "net"

+ "net/http"

+ "net/url"

+ "strings"

+)

+

+// SecureOptions controls the admin/share response policy. These pages are

+// deliberately not the themed site: no inline script or style, so the CSP

+// can stay tight.

+type SecureOptions struct {

+ // ScriptSrc is the CSP script-src value. Empty means "'none'"; the

+ // notices admin page needs "'self'" for admin.js, while share pages

+ // ship no JavaScript at all.

+ ScriptSrc string

+ // NoStore marks a response whose body must never be stored, even by

+ // the requesting browser -- a minted share URL is a bearer capability.

+ NoStore bool

+}

+

+// Secure sets the response headers every admin/share page must carry.

+func Secure(w http.ResponseWriter, opts SecureOptions) {

+ scriptSrc := opts.ScriptSrc

+ if scriptSrc == "" {

+ scriptSrc = "'none'"

+ }

+ hdr := w.Header()

+ hdr.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")

+ hdr.Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")

+ hdr.Set("Content-Security-Policy",

+ "default-src 'none'; style-src 'self'; script-src "+scriptSrc+

+ "; img-src 'self'; form-action 'self'; base-uri 'none'")

+ if opts.NoStore {

+ hdr.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")

+ }

+}

+

+// SameOrigin blocks a cross-site POST even if a session cookie would

+// otherwise be sent. A valid cookie proves the browser is logged in; it

+// does not prove the request came from our own page.

+func SameOrigin(r *http.Request) bool {

+ switch r.Header.Get("Sec-Fetch-Site") {

+ case "", "same-origin", "none":

+ default:

+ return false

+ }

+ if o := r.Header.Get("Origin"); o != "" {

+ u, err := url.Parse(o)

+ if err != nil || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, r.Host) {

+ return false

+ }

+ }

+ return true

+}

+

+// IsHTTPS reports whether the browser's original request was HTTPS,

+// accounting for the reverse proxy's X-Forwarded-Proto.

+func IsHTTPS(r *http.Request) bool {

+ return r.TLS != nil || strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https")

+}

+

+// AbsoluteURL builds an absolute URL for a path on this host, using the

+// same proxy-aware scheme as IsHTTPS.

+func AbsoluteURL(r *http.Request, path string) string {

+ scheme := "http"

+ if IsHTTPS(r) {

+ scheme = "https"

+ }

+ return scheme + "://" + r.Host + path

+}

+

+// RemoteIP strips the port from r.RemoteAddr for use as a rate-limit key.

+func RemoteIP(r *http.Request) string {

+ host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)

+ if err != nil {

+ return r.RemoteAddr

+ }

+ return host

+}

+package httpx

+

+import (

+ "net/http/httptest"

+ "strings"

+ "testing"

+)

+

+func TestSecure(t *testing.T) {

+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

+ Secure(rec, SecureOptions{ScriptSrc: "'self'", NoStore: true})

+ h := rec.Header()

+

+ if got := h.Get("X-Content-Type-Options"); got != "nosniff" {

+ t.Errorf("X-Content-Type-Options = %q", got)

+ }

+ if got := h.Get("X-Frame-Options"); got != "DENY" {

+ t.Errorf("X-Frame-Options = %q", got)

+ }

+ if got := h.Get("Cache-Control"); got != "no-store" {

+ t.Errorf("Cache-Control = %q", got)

+ }

+ if got := h.Get("Content-Security-Policy"); got == "" ||

+ !strings.Contains(got, "script-src 'self'") || !strings.Contains(got, "base-uri 'none'") {

+ t.Errorf("Content-Security-Policy = %q", got)

+ }

+}

+

+func TestSecureDefaultsToNoScript(t *testing.T) {

+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

+ Secure(rec, SecureOptions{})

+ if got := rec.Header().Get("Content-Security-Policy"); !strings.Contains(got, "script-src 'none'") {

+ t.Errorf("Content-Security-Policy = %q, want script-src 'none'", got)

+ }

+ if got := rec.Header().Get("Cache-Control"); got != "" {

+ t.Errorf("Cache-Control = %q, want unset", got)

+ }

+}

+

+func TestSameOrigin(t *testing.T) {

+ cases := []struct {

+ name string

+ fetch string

+ origin string

+ want bool

+ }{

+ {name: "no headers", want: true},

+ {name: "same origin", fetch: "same-origin", origin: "https://git.example", want: true},

+ {name: "cross site", fetch: "cross-site", want: false},

+ {name: "different origin", origin: "https://evil.example", want: false},

+ }

+

+ for _, tc := range cases {

+ t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {

+ r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://git.example/admin/notices", nil)

+ if tc.fetch != "" {

+ r.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", tc.fetch)

+ }

+ if tc.origin != "" {

+ r.Header.Set("Origin", tc.origin)

+ }

+ if got := SameOrigin(r); got != tc.want {

+ t.Fatalf("SameOrigin() = %v, want %v", got, tc.want)

+ }

+ })

+ }

+}

+

+func TestIsHTTPSAndAbsoluteURL(t *testing.T) {

+ r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://git.example/share/new", nil)

+ r.Host = "git.example"

+ if IsHTTPS(r) {

+ t.Fatal("plain request reported HTTPS")

+ }

+ if got := AbsoluteURL(r, "/share/view/token"); got != "http://git.example/share/view/token" {

+ t.Fatalf("AbsoluteURL() = %q", got)

+ }

+

+ r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")

+ if !IsHTTPS(r) {

+ t.Fatal("proxied HTTPS request not recognized")

+ }

+ if got := AbsoluteURL(r, "/share/view/token"); got != "https://git.example/share/view/token" {

+ t.Fatalf("AbsoluteURL() = %q", got)

+ }

+}

+

+func TestRemoteIP(t *testing.T) {

+ r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)

+ r.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:54321"

+ if got := RemoteIP(r); got != "203.0.113.9" {

+ t.Fatalf("RemoteIP() = %q", got)

+ }

+ r.RemoteAddr = "unix"

+ if got := RemoteIP(r); got != "unix" {

+ t.Fatalf("RemoteIP() = %q", got)

+ }

+}

+ "gsg/internal/access"

+ identity := access.Identity{

+ User: c.User,

+ SharedSlugs: c.SharedSlugs,

+ SharedIssuedAt: c.SharedIssuedAt,

+ }

+ if h.Info.AccessPolicy().CanView(identity) {

+

+ "gsg/internal/httpx"

+ httpx.Secure(w, httpx.SecureOptions{ScriptSrc: "'self'"})

+ httpx.Secure(w, httpx.SecureOptions{ScriptSrc: "'self'"})

+ if !httpx.SameOrigin(r) {

+ HttpOnly: true, Secure: httpx.IsHTTPS(r), SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,

+ "gsg/internal/access"

+ "gsg/internal/httpx"

+ httpx.Secure(w, httpx.SecureOptions{NoStore: true})

+ if !httpx.SameOrigin(r) {

+ // The result page's body is a bearer capability (the share URL itself),

+ // so unlike the rest of the site it must never be stored anywhere.

+ httpx.Secure(w, httpx.SecureOptions{NoStore: true})

+ Site: h.cfg.SiteName, Result: httpx.AbsoluteURL(r, "/share/view/"+tok),

+ httpx.Secure(w, httpx.SecureOptions{NoStore: true})

+ if !h.limiter.allow(httpx.RemoteIP(r)) {

+ if !access.ShareLive(revokedAfter, claims.IssuedAt()) {

+package site

+

+import (

+ "net/http"

+ "strings"

+

+ "gsg/internal/core"

+)

+

+// CompareRequest parses {range} into the base and head refs. The refs are

+// still resolved by core through gitx.Repo.Resolve; this only splits text.

+func CompareRequest(r *http.Request) (core.Request, error) {

+ rng := r.PathValue("range")

+ // Check three dots first: "a...b" also contains "..".

+ if base, head, ok := strings.Cut(rng, "..."); ok {

+ return core.Request{

+ Ref: head,

+ Range: &core.Range{Base: base, ThreeDot: true},

+ }, nil

+ }

+ if base, head, ok := strings.Cut(rng, ".."); ok {

+ return core.Request{

+ Ref: head,

+ Range: &core.Range{Base: base},

+ }, nil

+ }

+ return core.Request{}, core.Errorf(http.StatusBadRequest, "compare needs base..head")

+}

+package site

+

+import (

+ "net/http/httptest"

+ "testing"

+)

+

+func TestCompareRequest(t *testing.T) {

+ cases := []struct {

+ name string

+ rangeVal string

+ wantRef string

+ wantBase string

+ threeDot bool

+ wantErr bool

+ }{

+ {name: "two dot", rangeVal: "main..feature", wantRef: "feature", wantBase: "main"},

+ {name: "three dot", rangeVal: "main...feature", wantRef: "feature", wantBase: "main", threeDot: true},

+ {name: "refs with dots", rangeVal: "v1.0..v2.0", wantRef: "v2.0", wantBase: "v1.0"},

+ {name: "missing separator", rangeVal: "main", wantErr: true},

+ }

+

+ for _, tc := range cases {

+ t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {

+ req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/demo/compare/"+tc.rangeVal, nil)

+ req.SetPathValue("range", tc.rangeVal)

+ got, err := CompareRequest(req)

+ if tc.wantErr {

+ if err == nil {

+ t.Fatal("expected an error")

+ }

+ return

+ }

+ if err != nil {

+ t.Fatalf("CompareRequest: %v", err)

+ }

+ if got.Ref != tc.wantRef || got.Range == nil || got.Range.Base != tc.wantBase || got.Range.ThreeDot != tc.threeDot {

+ t.Fatalf("CompareRequest = %+v, want ref=%q base=%q threeDot=%v", got, tc.wantRef, tc.wantBase, tc.threeDot)

+ }

+ })

+ }

+}

+

+// The compare route must use the parser; the paginated routes must declare

+// their page size. Otherwise buildCtx silently falls back to defaults.

+func TestRoutesDeclareParsingMetadata(t *testing.T) {

+ routes := Routes()

+ byName := make(map[string]struct {

+ request bool

+ pageSize int

+ })

+ for _, rt := range routes {

+ byName[rt.Name] = struct {

+ request bool

+ pageSize int

+ }{

+ request: rt.Request != nil,

+ pageSize: rt.PageSize,

+ }

+ }

+

+ if !byName["compare"].request {

+ t.Error("compare route has no Request parser")

+ }

+ if byName["log"].pageSize == 0 {

+ t.Error("log route has no PageSize")

+ }

+ if byName["graph"].pageSize == 0 {

+ t.Error("graph route has no PageSize")

+ }

+}

+ Pattern: "GET /{repo}/log/{rest...}",

+ Render: core.View{Template: "log.html"},

+ PageSize: core.LogPageSize},

+ Pattern: "GET /{repo}/graph/{rest...}",

+ Render: core.View{Template: "graph.html"},

+ PageSize: core.GraphPageSize},

+ Render: core.View{Template: "compare.html"},

+ Request: CompareRequest},

+# gsg — a modular git browser

+

+cgit's weight, Hugo's composability, served dynamically. A **module**

+computes one piece of a view; a **route** binds a renderer to a URL pattern.

+Adding a feature means adding a module and calling it from a template —

+`internal/core` never changes.

+

+One dependency (`goldmark`, which itself has none) plus the `git` binary. Go 1.22+ (uses `net/http`

+pattern wildcards, so there is no router dependency either).

+

+```

+go build -o gsg .

+./gsg -root /srv/git -addr :8080 -name "rschanz.org"

+./gsg -root /srv/git -templates ./templates # re-parse the theme per request

+./gsg -root /srv/git -notices /etc/gsg/notices.yaml -admin-addr 127.0.0.1:8081

+```

+

+## The idea

+

+```go

+type Module func(c *Ctx, args ...string) (any, error)

+```

+

+Templates reach modules through one funcmap entry:

+

+```gotmpl

+{{ with mod "meta" }}<h1>{{ .Title }}</h1>{{ end }}

+{{ $d := mod "diff" }}

+{{ with modOr "readme" }}{{ .HTML }}{{ end }}

+```

+

+- **Lazy.** A template that calls `mod "authors"` is what *causes* authors to

+ be computed. Views that don't ask don't pay.

+- **Memoized twice.** Once per request (`Ctx.cache`), and once process-wide

+ against the resolved commit SHA (`core.LRU`).

+- **No manifest.** Dependencies are declared by use. There is no module list

+ to keep in sync with the templates.

+

+`internal/modules/example_authors.go` is a live demonstration: 30 lines, an

+`init()`, and one `{{ with mod "authors" }}` block. Nothing else moved.

+

+## Pages and endpoints are the same mechanism

+

+A route is `{pattern, renderer}`. `core.View` renders a template,

+`core.JSON` serializes an endpoint. Both take a `*Ctx`, both call modules.

+

+```go

+{Name: "commit", Immutable: true,

+ Pattern: "GET /{repo}/commit/{rev}",

+ Render: core.View{Template: "commit.html"}},

+

+{Name: "api-commit", Immutable: true,

+ Pattern: "GET /{repo}/api/commit/{rev}",

+ Render: core.JSON{Build: api.CommitEndpoint}},

+```

+

+### Endpoints use DTOs, not module values

+

+`internal/api` defines explicit structs and never marshals a module's return

+value. Go marshals every exported field by default, so serializing a module

+type means the day someone adds `Body` to `gitx.Commit`, commit messages are

+public. The allowlist is one readable file.

+

+```

+GET /api/repos.json site index

+GET /{repo}/api/repo.json slug, title, description, owner, section,

+ clone_url, default_branch, last_commit

+GET /{repo}/api/commit/{sha} sha, short, authored, parents, and

+ file/line counts — no subject, no body

+```

+

+## Routes

+

+| Route | URL |

+|---|---|

+| index | `/` |

+| repo | `/{repo}/` — default branch, last update, latest commit, README |

+| files | `/{repo}/tree/{ref}/{path}` |

+| file | `/{repo}/blob/{ref}/{path}` |

+| **raw bytes** | `/{repo}/raw/{ref}/{path}` |

+| log | `/{repo}/log/{ref}` |

+| refs | `/{repo}/refs/` |

+| commit | `/{repo}/commit/{sha}` |

+| **compare** | `/{repo}/compare/{base}..{head}` or `{base}...{head}` |

+| **branch graph** | `/{repo}/graph/` |

+

+### Compare

+

+`a..b` is the literal endpoint difference. `a...b` diffs from the merge

+base, which is what you want when reviewing a branch — it excludes changes

+that landed on the base since the branch forked. Verified against

+`git merge-base` on a diverged fixture: `topic..main` lists `topic.txt` as

+removed, `topic...main` does not.

+

+### Raw files

+

+A repository can contain an `.html` file with a `<script>` tag. Serving that

+as `text/html` on your own origin turns any push into stored XSS against the

+whole site — which is why GitHub puts raw content on

+`raw.githubusercontent.com`, a separate origin. Same-host serving is only

+safe if the response cannot be interpreted as a document, so `/raw/` sends

+`text/plain` (or `application/octet-stream` for binaries, plus

+`Content-Disposition: attachment`), with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`

+and `Content-Security-Policy: default-src \'none\'; sandbox` as a backstop.

+

+The exception is a validated raster image (PNG, JPEG, GIF, WebP, BMP, ICO,

+AVIF): when the extension and the magic bytes agree, `/raw/` declares the

+real `image/*` type inline so the blob page can preview it. An extension by

+itself is not enough — an `.png` whose contents are HTML still downloads as

+`application/octet-stream`. SVG is deliberately excluded: it is an XML

+document that can execute script, so it stays `text/plain`.

+

+If you would rather have real isolation, serve `/raw/` from a second

+hostname and the CSP becomes belt-and-braces rather than the only line.

+

+### Images and structured config files

+

+An image blob shows an inline preview with a `download` link to the same

+`/raw/` URL; images over 10 MiB skip the preview and offer the download only.

+

+JSON and YAML blobs get per-level indent guides, fold controls, key/value

+search, and YAML anchor/alias links. The search box also accepts a value

+path: typing `obj1.property3.items[4].val` resolves it against the parsed

+document and highlights that line and, for a container, its subtree. A

+query containing `.` or `[` is tried as a path first and falls back to

+plain substring search when it does not resolve, so dotted text stays

+searchable. Paths quote keys that need it (`obj1["a.b"]`) and attach indices

+directly; SVG is never previewed, and files past 512 KiB skip the parsing

+tooling entirely.

+

+### Branch graph

+

+`modules/graph.go` lays out the DAG in lanes in one pass over

+`git log --all --topo-order`, which guarantees a child is emitted before its

+parents. `active` holds, per lane, the SHA that lane is waiting to draw; a

+commit claims the lane expecting it (or a fresh one), hands that lane to its

+first parent, and opens a new lane per additional parent — which is what

+makes a merge fork visually.

+

+The module emits the per-row SVG because the geometry *is* the data, but

+every stroke refers to a CSS custom property (`--lane-0` … `--lane-5`), so

+the theme still owns the palette. Row height in the SVG must stay in sync

+with `table.graph td { height }` in the stylesheet.

+

+## Caching, which is the whole reason this works dynamically

+

+Every module result is a pure function of `(repo, commit SHA, path, args)`.

+Refs move; SHAs do not. So the process-wide cache is keyed on the resolved

+SHA and needs **no invalidation logic at all** — a stale entry is impossible

+by construction.

+

+`Ctx.Vars` are part of the cache key, not just the commit. They were not

+originally, and the bug was exactly the kind this cache should be immune to:

+`/compare/a..b` and `/compare/a...b` resolve to the same head commit, so the

+second request was served the first one\'s diff. Anything that changes what a

+module computes has to be in the key.

+

+ETags are derived from the resolved SHA plus a digest of every template

+file, *not* from the response body. A conditional request costs one ref

+lookup instead of a render, and restyling the theme invalidates every ETag

+at once (without the template digest, a restyled page keeps serving 304s).

+

+Two URL classes, two policies:

+

+| URL shape | Example | Cache-Control |

+|---|---|---|

+| SHA-addressed | `/demo/commit/64b90fff…` | `max-age=31536000, immutable` |

+| ref-addressed | `/demo/tree/main` | `no-cache` (revalidate via ETag) |

+

+## Ref-vs-path ambiguity

+

+`/{repo}/tree/{rest...}` fuses them, and `gitx.SplitRefPath` separates them

+by **longest matching prefix against the repo's actual ref list**, so

+`feature/x/src/main.go` resolves correctly. Splitting at the first `/` is

+wrong because branch names contain slashes; cgit dodges this with `?h=`

+query params, GitHub does what this does.

+

+## Serving is an attack surface; static generation was not

+

+- **Ref input never reaches `git rev-parse`.** rev-parse accepts an

+ expression language — `:/regex` searches history, `@{...}` reads the

+ reflog — and git subcommands treat a leading `-` as an option.

+ `gitx.Resolve` accepts either a hex SHA that already exists or an exact

+ match against the repo's own ref list. Verified: `--upload-pack=…`,

+ `:/secret`, `HEAD@{0}` and `-n` all return 404 with no side effects.

+- **Every git call is `exec.CommandContext`** with a per-request deadline

+ (`-timeout`, default 10s) and a scrubbed environment

+ (`GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1`, no `HOME`, no terminal prompt).

+- **Output is capped** at `MaxGit` (8 MiB) per command; a diff that exceeds

+ it renders truncated rather than eating the heap.

+

+## Layout

+

+```

+main.go flags, repo discovery, embedded assets

+internal/gitx/ the ONLY package that knows git exists

+internal/core/core.go Ctx, RepoInfo, module registry, Store

+internal/core/route.go Route, View, JSON, route request parsing

+internal/core/server.go request -> Ctx, ETags, cache policy

+internal/core/cache.go LRU keyed on commit SHAs

+internal/core/funcs.go template funcmap (mod, modOr, dict, date, bytes)

+internal/access/ visibility and share-grant policy (imports no core)

+internal/authn/ login/logout endpoints

+internal/httpx/ shared admin/share HTTP security helpers

+internal/modules/ meta refs log tree readme repos commit diff blob notices

+internal/notices/ notices YAML store + admin UI (imports no core)

+internal/api/ JSON DTOs — the serialization allowlist

+internal/site/routes.go the route table (the file you edit most)

+internal/site/request.go route-specific path parsers (compare ranges)

+templates/ layouts/ + views/

+```

+

+`gitx` shells out to plumbing, one process per query, `git log` in a single

+pass. Swapping in go-git means rewriting that one package.

+

+## Sections

+

+`gsg.section` groups repositories on the index. The `sections` module builds

+on `repos` rather than re-walking the repo set, so the index pays for its log

+lookups once. When no repo sets a section, it returns a single unnamed group

+and the template renders a flat list — no config, no headings.

+

+```sh

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.section "Infrastructure"

+```

+

+## Notices

+

+Operator-authored banners at the top of every page, site-wide and per

+repository. They live in one YAML file that is watched for changes, so

+editing it never needs a restart or a rebuild:

+

+```yaml

+global:

+ - type: critical # critical | warning | info | fix

+ title: Maintenance window

+ body: |

+ Saturday 02:00-04:00 UTC.

+ The site is read-only during the window.

+ link: https://status.example.org

+ link_text: status page

+repos:

+ demo:

+ - type: warning

+ title: Migrating to a new remote

+```

+

+```sh

+./gsg -root /srv/git -notices /etc/gsg/notices.yaml

+```

+

+Global notices render above every repository's; on the site index only the

+global list appears. The file is re-read on write (atomic-rename saves from

+an editor included); a parse error keeps the last good content rather than

+blanking the banners.

+

+### Editing from the web

+

+`-admin-addr` starts a second listener with a small HTML form to add, edit,

+and delete notices. It is deliberately separate from the read-only server:

+the admin routes are not reachable on the public port even if the reverse

+proxy is misconfigured.

+

+```sh

+./gsg -root /srv/git -notices /etc/gsg/notices.yaml -admin-addr 127.0.0.1:8081

+```

+

+Protect it with Caddy `forward_auth` and proxy it to the admin listener. gsg

+trusts the network in front of it, so the admin port must not be published

+directly. In Compose, put 8081 on the internal network only and pass

+`-admin-allow-remote`, because a container address is not loopback. Note

+that gsg performs no authentication itself -- the `forward_auth` block below

+is the only thing between the internet and the admin form.

+

+```caddyfile

+example.com {

+ # Admin: authenticate first, then proxy to the separate admin listener.

+ # handle, not handle_path: the admin mux matches the full /admin/...

+ # path, so stripping the prefix would 404 every request.

+ handle /admin/* {

+ forward_auth authentik:9000 {

+ uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy

+ copy_headers X-Authentik-Username

+ }

+ reverse_proxy gsg:8081

+ }

+

+ # Public, read-only.

+ handle {

+ reverse_proxy gsg:8080

+ }

+}

+```

+

+The `X-Authentik-Username` header is used only to attribute the mutation in

+the log; it is never consulted for authorization. By default Authentik

+decides who may reach the handler at all -- anyone forward_auth lets through

+`/admin/*` can edit notices.

+

+Mutations are POST-only, CSRF-protected (double-submit cookie plus

+`Origin`/`Sec-Fetch-Site`), and logged with the `X-Authentik-Username`

+header, which is used for audit only, never for authorization.

+

+### Gating notices editing to a group

+

+`/admin/*` is also where [Login](#login) mints the `gsg_user` cookie, so

+forward_auth for the whole prefix is usually left open to everyone you want

+able to log in (for share links, hidden-repo visibility, etc). To let more

+people log in without also handing them notices editing, add `-admin-group`:

+

+```sh

+./gsg -root /srv/git -notices /etc/gsg/notices.yaml \

+ -admin-addr 127.0.0.1:8081 -admin-group gsg-admins

+```

+

+This checks the `X-Authentik-Groups` header (override with

+`-admin-group-header`) for `gsg-admins` among its `|`-delimited entries,

+Authentik's own format for that header, and answers `403` to any request

+under `/admin/notices` from a caller that isn't a member -- before the

+handler does anything else, including setting the CSRF cookie. Add the group

+header to the same `forward_auth` block used above:

+

+```caddyfile

+ forward_auth authentik:9000 {

+ uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy

+ copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups

+ }

+```

+

+Leaving `-admin-group` unset keeps today's behavior: anyone forward_auth

+admits to `/admin/*` can edit notices.

+

+**Immutable commit pages carry no notices.** `/{repo}/commit/{rev}` is

+served `Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable`, so a banner

+rendered into it would stay frozen in the reader's browser. Notices are

+suppressed there by design; every other page picks them up on the next

+request.

+

+## Login

+

+Logging in reveals hidden repos whose `gsg.visible-to` list includes your

+username; everyone else, logged in or not, sees exactly what an anonymous

+visitor sees. It reuses the same Authentik `forward_auth` setup as the

+notices admin UI above, and needs nothing extra beyond `-admin-addr`

+(notices editing is not required — `-admin-addr` alone is enough to enable

+login).

+

+```sh

+./gsg -root /srv/git -admin-addr 127.0.0.1:8081

+```

+

+```caddyfile

+example.com {

+ # Login: same trust boundary as /admin/*, one hop mints the cookie

+ # and redirects back. This must be the exact path, not /auth/*: gsg

+ # also serves /auth/logout, but on the *public* listener, since

+ # logging out only clears gsg's own cookie and needs no Authentik

+ # round trip at all. Routing /auth/* here would send logout to the

+ # admin listener too, where no such handler exists, and gate it

+ # behind an Authentik check it doesn't need.

+ handle /auth/login {

+ forward_auth authentik:9000 {

+ uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy

+ copy_headers X-Authentik-Username

+ }

+ reverse_proxy gsg:8081

+ }

+

+ # Public, read-only (also handles /auth/logout, /share/new, /share/view/*).

+ handle {

+ reverse_proxy gsg:8080

+ }

+}

+```

+

+Visiting `/auth/login` (through Caddy, so `X-Authentik-Username` is set and

+trustworthy by the time gsg sees the request) mints a signed, stateless

+`gsg_user` cookie and redirects back to `/`. The cookie is verified on the

+public listener with an in-memory key — nothing is written to disk, and a

+process restart signs everyone out. `/auth/logout` clears it and needs no

+round trip through Authentik, since it only has to forget gsg's own cookie.

+

+**There is no "log in" link anywhere in the UI.** `/auth/login` is not

+discoverable from the site; people who need it are told the URL out of

+band. Once logged in, the nav bar shows who you are and a log-out link.

+

+## Share links

+

+Once logged in, `/share/new` lets you pick from your own hidden repos and

+mint a link that grants view access to exactly those repos to anyone who

+has it — no login, no Authentik involvement. It's entirely stateless: the

+link is a signed, self-contained token, and gsg keeps no record of what's

+been shared. An optional password can gate it.

+

+```

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.share-max-age "720h"

+```

+

+`gsg.share-max-age` (Go duration syntax, default 30 days if unset) is both

+the ceiling no link's expiry may exceed and the default when the minting

+form doesn't specify one — you can always ask for less, never more. Sharing

+several repos at once uses the smallest ceiling among them.

+

+**Passwords are never stored, not even hashed.** The password is folded

+directly into the link's signature instead of being embedded in it: nobody

+holding just the URL has anything to brute-force offline, and checking a

+guess requires asking the server, which rate-limits attempts. This is a

+soft gate appropriate for a small self-hosted tool, not a cryptographic

+secret protecting high-value data.

+

+**Revocation.** A stateless token can't be individually revoked — there's

+no list of what's been issued. The one lever:

+

+```

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.share-revoked-after "$(date +%s)"

+```

+

+Any share grant for that repo issued at or before this timestamp stops

+working immediately, including in a browser that already redeemed the

+link — not just future redemptions. Two things worth knowing before you

+rely on this:

+

+- There's no per-recipient state, so revoking means invalidating *every*

+ outstanding share of that repo, then re-sharing with whoever should still

+ have it.

+- Removing a username from `gsg.visible-to` does **not** revoke a share

+ link that user already minted for that repo. The two mechanisms are

+ independent; only `gsg.share-revoked-after` invalidates outstanding

+ shares.

+

+## README rendering

+

+`modules/markdown.go` uses goldmark with GFM, Typographer, and automatic

+heading IDs — Hugo\'s own goldmark defaults, so a README renders identically

+to the same file on your blog.

+

+`WithUnsafe` is deliberately not set, which is also Hugo\'s default. Anyone

+who can push can write a README, so raw HTML in markdown is untrusted input;

+goldmark drops it. A `<script>` committed to a README comes out as

+`<!-- raw HTML omitted -->`.

+

+Relative links are rewritten against the file\'s own directory: links become

+the blob view, images become `/raw/` (an `<img>` needs bytes, not an HTML

+page). Absolute URLs, site-absolute paths, fragments and `mailto:` are left

+alone, and anything resolving above the repo root is not rewritten.

+

+## Per-repository config

+

+Read from each repo's own git config, cgit-style, with `gitweb.*` and the

+legacy `description` file as fallbacks, so an existing cgit tree works as-is:

+

+```sh

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.title "Demo Project"

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.description "A demo repository"

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.clone "git://rschanz.org/demo"

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.hide true

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.visible-to "alice,bob"

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.share-max-age "720h"

+git --git-dir=/srv/git/demo.git config gsg.share-revoked-after "$(date +%s)"

+```

+

+Add a key by adding a field to `core.RepoInfo` and a line in `LoadRepoInfo`.

+

+A repo's slug is its directory name (minus `.git`), and slugs share the

+public listener's URL namespace with a few reserved top-level paths:

+`static`, `auth`, and `share`. A repo named e.g. `share.git` would collide

+with the share-link endpoints below and is not supported.

+

+`gsg.visible-to` is a comma-separated allowlist of usernames (matched

+case-insensitively against a logged-in session, see "Login" below) who may

+see this repo even though `gsg.hide` is set. It's a separate key from

+`gsg.owner` on purpose: `Owner` is a free-text display field that falls

+back to `gitweb.owner` for cgit-migrated repos, so treating it as an access

+list could silently grant visibility nobody intended.

+

+## Theme

+

+Monospace-first: every value on these pages is an identifier, hash, path or

+count, so the interface type is the same face as the code, and the sans face

+appears only inside rendered README prose. A cool slate ramp, one indigo

+accent, and a six-colour lane ramp shared by the commit graph and its branch

+chips. Light and dark both defined via `prefers-color-scheme`.

+

+Diffs mark the gutter rather than flooding whole rows with green and red —

+the signal stays readable when a hunk is mostly additions.

+

+No webfonts; system stacks only, so there is no third-party request. All

+colour lives in `:root` custom properties in `static/style.css`.

+

+## Known gaps

+

+- **No syntax highlighting.** `blob` returns numbered plain lines; Chroma

+ drops into the same module.

+- **No pagination on `log` or `graph`.** They cap at 200 and 150 commits.

+- **The graph loads all refs into memory** before laying out. Fine to a few

+ thousand commits; beyond that it needs windowing.

+- **The LRU is bounded by entry count, not bytes.** A giant diff and a ref

+ list cost the same slot. The `Store` interface is the only thing a

+ size-aware replacement has to satisfy.

+- **Repo discovery is one level deep** and happens once at startup; a repo

+ created later needs a restart.

+- **Module errors surface at render time**, not load time. Add a CI pass

+ that renders every view against a fixture repo.

+ "gsg/internal/authn"

+ authnHandlers, err := authn.NewHandlers(authn.Config{

+ Sessions: sessions,

+ UserHeader: "X-Authentik-Username",

+ })

+ if err != nil {

+ return err

+ }

+ // through site.Routes() because core.Route's Renderer always builds a

+ // body from a Ctx, and a redirect-plus-Set-Cookie doesn't fit that shape.

+ mux.Handle("GET /auth/logout", authnHandlers.Logout)

+ if h.Info.AccessPolicy().CanShare(user) {

+ amux.Handle("GET /auth/login", authnHandlers.Login)

+ <span>{{ .Site.Name }} v1.4</span>