diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index 29f6d3516c..f7ffd4e94c 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/libbase-use-own-logging.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/libbonobo-activation-test-race.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/libcanberra-sound-theme-freedesktop.patch \ + %D%/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch \ + %D%/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/libdrm-symbol-check.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/libetonyek-build-with-mdds-1.2.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/libevent-dns-tests.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/gnome.scm b/gnu/packages/gnome.scm index 96dcbda72e..fc19318b91 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/gnome.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/gnome.scm @@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ (define-public glade3 (define-public libcroco (package (name "libcroco") + (replacement libcroco/fixed) (version "0.6.11") (source (origin (method url-fetch) @@ -972,6 +973,19 @@ (define-public libcroco ;; LGPLv2.1-only. (license license:lgpl2.1))) +(define libcroco/fixed + (package + (inherit libcroco) + (replacement #f) + (source + (origin + (inherit (package-source libcroco)) + (patches + (append + (origin-patches (package-source libcroco)) + (search-patches "libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch" + "libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch"))))))) + (define-public libgsf (package (name "libgsf") diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0319c7389f --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +Fix CVE-2017-7960: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7960 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://git.gnome.org/browse/libcroco/commit/?id=898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 + +From 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro +Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:13:43 +0200 +Subject: input: check end of input before reading a byte + +When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't +out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which +could deal to a security bug. +--- + src/cr-input.c | 11 +++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/cr-input.c b/src/cr-input.c +index 49000b1..3b63a88 100644 +--- a/src/cr-input.c ++++ b/src/cr-input.c +@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ cr_input_new_from_uri (const gchar * a_file_uri, enum CREncoding a_enc) + *we should free buf here because it's own by CRInput. + *(see the last parameter of cr_input_new_from_buf(). + */ +- buf = NULL ; ++ buf = NULL; + } + + cleanup: +@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (CRInput const * a_this) + enum CRStatus + cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte) + { ++ gulong nb_bytes_left = 0; ++ + g_return_val_if_fail (a_this && PRIVATE (a_this) + && a_byte, CR_BAD_PARAM_ERROR); + +@@ -413,6 +415,12 @@ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte) + if (PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_input == TRUE) + return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR; + ++ nb_bytes_left = cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (a_this); ++ ++ if (nb_bytes_left < 1) { ++ return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR; ++ } ++ + *a_byte = PRIVATE (a_this)->in_buf[PRIVATE (a_this)->next_byte_index]; + + if (PRIVATE (a_this)->nb_bytes - +@@ -477,7 +485,6 @@ cr_input_read_char (CRInput * a_this, guint32 * a_char) + if (*a_char == '\n') { + PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_line = TRUE; + } +- + } + + return status; +-- +cgit v0.12 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..675dbe4f08 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +Fix CVE-2017-7961: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7961 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://git.gnome.org/browse/libcroco/commit/?id=9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 + +From 9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro +Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:56:09 +0200 +Subject: tknzr: support only max long rgb values + +This fixes a possible out of bound when reading rgbs which +are longer than the support MAXLONG +--- + src/cr-tknzr.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/cr-tknzr.c b/src/cr-tknzr.c +index 1a7cfeb..1548c35 100644 +--- a/src/cr-tknzr.c ++++ b/src/cr-tknzr.c +@@ -1279,6 +1279,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb) + status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num); + ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL)); + ++ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) { ++ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR; ++ goto error; ++ } ++ + red = num->val; + cr_num_destroy (num); + num = NULL; +@@ -1298,6 +1303,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb) + status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num); + ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL)); + ++ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) { ++ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR; ++ goto error; ++ } ++ + PEEK_BYTE (a_this, 1, &next_bytes[0]); + if (next_bytes[0] == '%') { + SKIP_CHARS (a_this, 1); +-- +cgit v0.12 +