mirror of
https://git.in.rschanz.org/ryan77627/guix.git
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gnu: openssh: Update to 7.3p1.
* gnu/packages/ssh.scm (openssh): Update to 7.3p1. [source]: Remove patches. * gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch, gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch, gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch, gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch: Delete files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
This commit is contained in:
Mark H Weaver
parent
660e005c21
commit
742effef56
6 changed files with 2 additions and 326 deletions
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@ -694,10 +694,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
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%D%/packages/patches/openexr-missing-samples.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openjpeg-CVE-2015-6581.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openjpeg-use-after-free-fix.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch \
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@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
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From 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
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Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2016 10:39:57 +1000
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Subject: ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes
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If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables
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and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may
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attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables
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set via PAM.
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CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson
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---
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session.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
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index 4859245..4653b09 100644
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--- a/session.c
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+++ b/session.c
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@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
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* Pull in any environment variables that may have
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* been set by PAM.
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*/
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- if (options.use_pam) {
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+ if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
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char **p;
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p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
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--
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cgit v0.11.2
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@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
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From e5ef9d3942cebda819a6fd81647b51c8d87d23df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 13:32:45 +1000
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Subject: Determine appropriate salt for invalid users.
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When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses
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the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the
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password supplied by the client. That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on
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systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid
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salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing
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from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512). This allows
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user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings. This was noted
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by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210).
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To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing
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passwords for users that do not exist on the system. ok djm@
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Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc
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Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902
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Last-Update: 2016-07-22
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Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-1.patch
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---
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auth-passwd.c | 12 ++++++++----
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openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c
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index 63ccf3c..530b5d4 100644
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--- a/auth-passwd.c
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+++ b/auth-passwd.c
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@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int
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sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
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{
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struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
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- char *encrypted_password;
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+ char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
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/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
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char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
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@@ -202,9 +202,13 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
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if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
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return (1);
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- /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
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- encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
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- (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
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+ /*
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+ * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
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+ * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
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+ */
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+ if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
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+ salt = pw_password;
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+ encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
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/*
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* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
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diff --git a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
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index 8577cbd..8913bb8 100644
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--- a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
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+++ b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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+#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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@@ -62,11 +63,44 @@
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# define crypt DES_crypt
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# endif
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+/*
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+ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
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+ * system.
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+ */
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+static const char *
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+pick_salt(void)
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+{
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+ struct passwd *pw;
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+ char *passwd, *p;
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+ size_t typelen;
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+ static char salt[32];
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+
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+ if (salt[0] != '\0')
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+ return salt;
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+ strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
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+ if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
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+ return salt;
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+ passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
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+ if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL)
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+ return salt; /* no $, DES */
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+ typelen = p - passwd + 1;
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+ strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
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+ explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
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+ return salt;
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+}
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+
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char *
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xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
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{
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char *crypted;
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+ /*
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+ * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for
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+ * for timing purposes. Pick an appropriate salt.
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+ */
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+ if (salt == NULL)
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+ salt = pick_salt();
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+
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# ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
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if (is_md5_salt(salt))
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crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
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@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
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From dde63f7f998ac3812a26bbb2c1b2947f24fcd060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 13:49:44 +1000
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Subject: Mitigate timing of disallowed users PAM logins.
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When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and
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it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for
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the failure is not noticeably different whether or not the password
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is correct. This behaviour can be detected by sending a very long
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password string which is slower to hash than the fake password.
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Mitigate by constructing an invalid password that is the same length
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as the one from the client and thus takes the same time to hash.
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Diff from djm@
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Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946
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Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902
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Last-Update: 2016-07-22
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Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-2.patch
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---
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auth-pam.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
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1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
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index 8425af1..abd6a5e 100644
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--- a/auth-pam.c
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+++ b/auth-pam.c
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@@ -232,7 +232,6 @@ static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
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static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
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static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
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static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
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-static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
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/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
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#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
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@@ -810,12 +809,35 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
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return (-1);
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}
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+/*
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+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
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+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
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+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
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+ */
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+static char *
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+fake_password(const char *wire_password)
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+{
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+ const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
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+ char *ret = NULL;
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+ size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
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+
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+ if (l >= INT_MAX)
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+ fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
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+
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+ ret = malloc(l + 1);
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+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
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+ ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
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+ ret[i] = '\0';
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+ return ret;
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+}
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+
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/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
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static int
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sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
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{
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Buffer buffer;
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struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
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+ char *fake;
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debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
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switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
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@@ -836,8 +858,11 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
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(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
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options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
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buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
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- else
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- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
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+ else {
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+ fake = fake_password(*resp);
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+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake);
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+ free(fake);
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+ }
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if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
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buffer_free(&buffer);
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return (-1);
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@@ -1181,6 +1206,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
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{
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int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
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PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
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+ char *fake = NULL;
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if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
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fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
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@@ -1196,7 +1222,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
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*/
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if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
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options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
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- sshpam_password = badpw;
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+ sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
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sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
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(const void *)&passwd_conv);
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@@ -1206,6 +1232,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
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sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
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sshpam_password = NULL;
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+ free(fake);
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if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
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debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
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authctxt->user);
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@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
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From abde8dda29c2db2405d6fbca2fe022430e2c1177 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
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Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 14:17:31 +1000
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Subject: Search users for one with a valid salt.
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If the root account is locked (eg password "!!" or "*LK*") keep looking
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until we find a user with a valid salt to use for crypting passwords of
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invalid users. ok djm@
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Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=dbf788b4d9d9490a5fff08a7b09888272bb10fcc
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Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902
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Last-Update: 2016-07-22
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Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-3.patch
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---
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openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
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1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
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index 8913bb8..cf6a9b9 100644
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--- a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
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+++ b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
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@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@
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/*
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* Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
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- * system.
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+ * system by searching through accounts until we find one that has a valid
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+ * salt. Usually this will be root unless the root account is locked out.
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+ * If we don't find one we return a traditional DES-based salt.
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*/
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static const char *
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pick_salt(void)
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@@ -78,14 +80,18 @@ pick_salt(void)
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if (salt[0] != '\0')
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return salt;
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strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
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- if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
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- return salt;
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- passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
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- if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL)
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- return salt; /* no $, DES */
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- typelen = p - passwd + 1;
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- strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
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- explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
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+ setpwent();
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+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
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+ passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
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+ if (passwd[0] == '$' && (p = strrchr(passwd+1, '$')) != NULL) {
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+ typelen = p - passwd + 1;
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+ strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
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+ explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ out:
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+ endpwent();
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return salt;
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}
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@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ (define-public libssh2
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(define-public openssh
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(package
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(name "openssh")
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(version "7.2p2")
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(version "7.3p1")
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(source (origin
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(method url-fetch)
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(uri (let ((tail (string-append name "-" version ".tar.gz")))
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@ -135,11 +135,7 @@ (define-public openssh
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(string-append "http://ftp2.fr.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/"
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tail))))
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(sha256 (base32
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"132lh9aanb0wkisji1d6cmsxi520m8nh7c7i9wi6m1s3l38q29x7"))
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(patches (search-patches "openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch"
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"openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch"
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"openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch"
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"openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch"))))
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"1k5y1wi29d47cgizbryxrhc1fbjsba2x8l5mqfa9b9nadnd9iyrz"))))
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(build-system gnu-build-system)
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(inputs `(("groff" ,groff)
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("openssl" ,openssl)
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|
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Loading…
Reference in a new issue