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gnu: qemu: Update to 2.10.2.
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch, gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15119.patch, gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch: Delete files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them. * gnu/packages/virtualization.scm (qemu): Update to 2.10.2. [source](patches): Remove obsolete.
This commit is contained in:
Marius Bakke
parent
2ea3333504
commit
937790df9d
5 changed files with 2 additions and 196 deletions
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@ -1032,9 +1032,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
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%D%/packages/patches/python2-subprocess32-disable-input-test.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/python2-unittest2-remove-argparse.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15038.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15119.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15289.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qt4-ldflags.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qtscript-disable-tests.patch \
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@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
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Fix CVE-2017-15118:
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15118
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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1516922
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183
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From 51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 15:07:22 -0600
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Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2017-15118 Stack smash on large export name
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Introduced in commit f37708f6b8 (2.10). The NBD spec says a client
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can request export names up to 4096 bytes in length, even though
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they should not expect success on names longer than 256. However,
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qemu hard-codes the limit of 256, and fails to filter out a client
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that probes for a longer name; the result is a stack smash that can
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potentially give an attacker arbitrary control over the qemu
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process.
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The smash can be easily demonstrated with this client:
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$ qemu-io f raw nbd://localhost:10809/$(printf %3000d 1 | tr ' ' a)
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If the qemu NBD server binary (whether the standalone qemu-nbd, or
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the builtin server of QMP nbd-server-start) was compiled with
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-fstack-protector-strong, the ability to exploit the stack smash
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into arbitrary execution is a lot more difficult (but still
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theoretically possible to a determined attacker, perhaps in
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combination with other CVEs). Still, crashing a running qemu (and
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losing the VM) is bad enough, even if the attacker did not obtain
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full execution control.
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CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
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Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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---
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nbd/server.c | 4 ++++
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
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index a81801e3bc..92c0fdd03b 100644
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--- a/nbd/server.c
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+++ b/nbd/server.c
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@@ -386,6 +386,10 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_handle_info(NBDClient *client, uint32_t length,
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msg = "name length is incorrect";
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goto invalid;
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}
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+ if (namelen >= sizeof(name)) {
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+ msg = "name too long for qemu";
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+ goto invalid;
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+ }
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if (nbd_read(client->ioc, name, namelen, errp) < 0) {
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return -EIO;
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}
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--
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2.15.0
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@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
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Fix CVE-2017-15119:
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15119
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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1516925
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=fdad35ef6c5839d50dfc14073364ac893afebc30
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From fdad35ef6c5839d50dfc14073364ac893afebc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 16:25:16 -0600
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Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2017-15119 Reject options larger than 32M
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The NBD spec gives us permission to abruptly disconnect on clients
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that send outrageously large option requests, rather than having
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to spend the time reading to the end of the option. No real
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option request requires that much data anyways; and meanwhile, we
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already have the practice of abruptly dropping the connection on
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any client that sends NBD_CMD_WRITE with a payload larger than 32M.
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For comparison, nbdkit drops the connection on any request with
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more than 4096 bytes; however, that limit is probably too low
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(as the NBD spec states an export name can theoretically be up
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to 4096 bytes, which means a valid NBD_OPT_INFO could be even
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longer) - even if qemu doesn't permit exports longer than 256
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bytes.
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It could be argued that a malicious client trying to get us to
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read nearly 4G of data on a bad request is a form of denial of
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service. In particular, if the server requires TLS, but a client
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that does not know the TLS credentials sends any option (other
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than NBD_OPT_STARTTLS or NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME) with a stated
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payload of nearly 4G, then the server was keeping the connection
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alive trying to read all the payload, tying up resources that it
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would rather be spending on a client that can get past the TLS
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handshake. Hence, this warranted a CVE.
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Present since at least 2.5 when handling known options, and made
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worse in 2.6 when fixing support for NBD_FLAG_C_FIXED_NEWSTYLE
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to handle unknown options.
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CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
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Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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---
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nbd/server.c | 6 ++++++
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
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index 7d6801b427..a81801e3bc 100644
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--- a/nbd/server.c
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+++ b/nbd/server.c
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@@ -673,6 +673,12 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_options(NBDClient *client, uint16_t myflags,
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}
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length = be32_to_cpu(length);
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+ if (length > NBD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE) {
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+ error_setg(errp, "len (%" PRIu32" ) is larger than max len (%u)",
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+ length, NBD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE);
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+ return -EINVAL;
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+ }
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+
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trace_nbd_negotiate_options_check_option(option,
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nbd_opt_lookup(option));
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if (client->tlscreds &&
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--
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2.15.0
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@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
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Fix CVE-2017-15268:
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15268
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=a7b20a8efa28e5f22c26c06cd06c2f12bc863493
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From a7b20a8efa28e5f22c26c06cd06c2f12bc863493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 14:43:42 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] io: monitor encoutput buffer size from websocket GSource
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The websocket GSource is monitoring the size of the rawoutput
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buffer to determine if the channel can accepts more writes.
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The rawoutput buffer, however, is merely a temporary staging
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buffer before data is copied into the encoutput buffer. Thus
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its size will always be zero when the GSource runs.
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This flaw causes the encoutput buffer to grow without bound
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if the other end of the underlying data channel doesn't
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read data being sent. This can be seen with VNC if a client
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is on a slow WAN link and the guest OS is sending many screen
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updates. A malicious VNC client can act like it is on a slow
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link by playing a video in the guest and then reading data
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very slowly, causing QEMU host memory to expand arbitrarily.
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This issue is assigned CVE-2017-15268, publically reported in
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1718964
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Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
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---
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io/channel-websock.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/io/channel-websock.c b/io/channel-websock.c
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index d1d471f86e..04bcc059cd 100644
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--- a/io/channel-websock.c
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+++ b/io/channel-websock.c
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
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#include <time.h>
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-/* Max amount to allow in rawinput/rawoutput buffers */
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+/* Max amount to allow in rawinput/encoutput buffers */
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#define QIO_CHANNEL_WEBSOCK_MAX_BUFFER 8192
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#define QIO_CHANNEL_WEBSOCK_CLIENT_KEY_LEN 24
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@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ qio_channel_websock_source_check(GSource *source)
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if (wsource->wioc->rawinput.offset || wsource->wioc->io_eof) {
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cond |= G_IO_IN;
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}
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- if (wsource->wioc->rawoutput.offset < QIO_CHANNEL_WEBSOCK_MAX_BUFFER) {
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+ if (wsource->wioc->encoutput.offset < QIO_CHANNEL_WEBSOCK_MAX_BUFFER) {
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cond |= G_IO_OUT;
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}
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--
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2.15.0
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@ -81,19 +81,16 @@ (define (qemu-patch commit file-name sha256)
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(define-public qemu
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(package
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(name "qemu")
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(version "2.10.1")
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(version "2.10.2")
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(source (origin
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(method url-fetch)
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(uri (string-append "https://download.qemu.org/qemu-"
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version ".tar.xz"))
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(patches (search-patches "qemu-CVE-2017-15038.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-15119.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-15289.patch"))
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(sha256
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(base32
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"1ahwl7r18iw2ds0q3c51nlivqsan9hcgnc8bbf9pv366iy81mm8x"))))
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"17w21spvaxaidi2am5lpsln8yjpyp2zi3s3gc6nsxj5arlgamzgw"))))
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(build-system gnu-build-system)
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(arguments
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'(;; Running tests in parallel can occasionally lead to failures, like:
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