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gnu: glibc: Fix replacement on i686.

Browse source 
This is followup to 665d6a5916.
Fixes <https://bugs.gnu.org/27489>.

* gnu/packages/base.scm (glibc-2.25-patched, glibc-2.24, glibc-2.23)
(glibc-2.22): Add glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch to patches.
Move a comment where it belongs.
* gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch: Swap with ...
* gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch: ... this.
* gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch: New file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.  Fix formatting.
This commit is contained in:
Mark H Weaver 2017-06-25 20:58:17 -04:00
parent afc9d8ec2b
commit ffc015bea2
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 7CEF29847562C516
5 changed files with 311 additions and 283 deletions
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7
gnu/local.mk
View file

@ -630,14 +630,15 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/ghostscript-runpath.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/ghostscript-runpath.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glib-networking-ssl-cert-file.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glib-networking-ssl-cert-file.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glib-tests-timer.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glib-tests-timer.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-bootstrap-system.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-bootstrap-system.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-locales.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-locales.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-memchr-overflow-i686.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-memchr-overflow-i686.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-o-largefile.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-o-largefile.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-versioned-locpath.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-versioned-locpath.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glog-gcc-5-demangling.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/glog-gcc-5-demangling.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/gmp-arm-asm-nothumb.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/gmp-arm-asm-nothumb.patch \

10
gnu/packages/base.scm
View file

@ -902,9 +902,6 @@ (define* (glibc-for-target #:optional
(define-syntax glibc (define-syntax glibc
(identifier-syntax (glibc-for-target))) (identifier-syntax (glibc-for-target)))
;; Below are old libc versions, which we use mostly to build locale data in
;; the old format (which the new libc cannot cope with.)
(define glibc-2.25-patched (define glibc-2.25-patched
(package (package
(inherit glibc) (inherit glibc)
@ -914,10 +911,14 @@ (define glibc-2.25-patched
(patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch" (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
"glibc-versioned-locpath.patch" "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
"glibc-o-largefile.patch" "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
"glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch" "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch" "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch")))))) "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
;; Below are old libc versions, which we use mostly to build locale data in
;; the old format (which the new libc cannot cope with.)
(define-public glibc-2.24 (define-public glibc-2.24
(package (package
(inherit glibc) (inherit glibc)
@ -933,6 +934,7 @@ (define-public glibc-2.24
(patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch" (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
"glibc-versioned-locpath.patch" "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
"glibc-o-largefile.patch" "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
"glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch" "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch" "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch")))))) "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
@ -952,6 +954,7 @@ (define-public glibc-2.23
(patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch" (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
"glibc-versioned-locpath.patch" "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
"glibc-o-largefile.patch" "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
"glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch" "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch" "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch")))))) "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
@ -969,6 +972,7 @@ (define-public glibc-2.22
(base32 (base32
"0j49682pm2nh4qbdw35bas82p1pgfnz4d2l7iwfyzvrvj0318wzb")) "0j49682pm2nh4qbdw35bas82p1pgfnz4d2l7iwfyzvrvj0318wzb"))
(patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch" (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
"glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch" "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch" "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch")))) "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))

274
gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch
View file

@ -1,206 +1,124 @@
From 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
patch from: patch from:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8
--- ---
ChangeLog | 11 +++++++ ChangeLog | 7 ++++++
elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
index 86ae20c..65647fb 100644 index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c --- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c +++ b/elf/rtld.c
@@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p) @@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
return *p != '\0'; strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
} #endif
-/* List of auditing DSOs. */ +/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,
+/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the + particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active. */
+ audit_list below. */ +#ifdef NAME_MAX
+const char *audit_list_string; +# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX
+#else
+# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
+#endif
+#ifdef PATH_MAX
+# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
+#else
+# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
+#endif
+ +
+/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs. audit_list->next is the first +/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
+ element. */ + directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names
+ unconditionally. */
+static bool
+dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+{
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
+ {
+ /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
+ programs, and also skip overlong names. */
+ size_t len = strlen (p);
+ if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
+ return false;
+ }
+ return *p != '\0';
+}
/* List of auditing DSOs. */
static struct audit_list static struct audit_list
{ @@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
const char *name; /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */
struct audit_list *next; static int version_info attribute_relro;
} *audit_list;
+/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list. */ +/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+struct audit_list_iter + separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+ executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
+ (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
+ ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads
+ performed. */
+unsigned int
+handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
+{ +{
+ /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL. */ + unsigned int npreloads = 0;
+ const char *audit_list_tail; + const char *p = preloadlist;
+ char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
+ +
+ /* The list element returned in the previous iteration. NULL before + while (*p != '\0')
+ the first element. */
+ struct audit_list *previous;
+
+ /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
+ audit_list_string. */
+ char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];
+};
+
+/* Initialize an audit list iterator. */
+static void
+audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
+{
+ iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
+ iter->previous = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list. */
+static const char *
+audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
+{
+ if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
+ { + {
+ /* First iterate over audit_list_string. */ + /* Split preload list at space/colon. */
+ while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0') + size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
+ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
+ { + {
+ /* Split audit list at colon. */ + memcpy (fname, p, len);
+ size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":"); + fname[len] = '\0';
+ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))
+ {
+ memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
+ iter->fname[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ /* Do not return this name to the caller. */
+ iter->fname[0] = '\0';
+
+ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
+ iter->audit_list_tail += len;
+ if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
+ ++iter->audit_list_tail;
+
+ /* If the name is valid, return it. */
+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
+ return iter->fname;
+ /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name. */
+ } + }
+ /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list. */ + else
+ } + fname[0] = '\0';
+ +
+ if (iter->previous == NULL) + /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
+ { + p += len;
+ if (audit_list == NULL) + if (*p != '\0')
+ /* No pre-parsed audit list. */ + ++p;
+ return NULL; +
+ /* Start of audit list. The first list element is at + if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
+ audit_list->next (cyclic list). */ + npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+ iter->previous = audit_list->next;
+ return iter->previous->name;
+ } + }
+ if (iter->previous == audit_list) + return npreloads;
+ /* Cyclic list wrap-around. */
+ return NULL;
+ iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
+ return iter->previous->name;
+} +}
+ +
#ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS static void
/* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs. This ElfW(Word) phnum,
@@ -1305,11 +1383,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\ @@ -1464,23 +1529,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
/* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now. */ if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
- if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
+ bool need_security_init = true;
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
+ || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
{ {
- /* Iterate over all entries in the list. The order is important. */ - /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL; - separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
- struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next; - executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
+ struct audit_list_iter al_iter; - list. If the binary is running setuid all elements
+ audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter); - containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */
- char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
/* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to - char *p;
initialize the data structures now. */
@@ -1320,9 +1400,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
fail later on. */
security_init ();
+ need_security_init = false;
- do
+ while (true)
{
+ const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
+ if (name == NULL)
+ break;
+
int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
/* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set. The reason is that we know
glibc will use the static model. */
struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
- dlmargs.fname = al->name;
+ dlmargs.fname = name;
dlmargs.map = NULL;
const char *objname;
@@ -1344,7 +1429,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
not_loaded:
_dl_error_printf ("\
ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
- al->name, err_str);
+ name, err_str);
if (malloced)
free ((char *) err_str);
}
@@ -1448,10 +1533,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
goto not_loaded;
}
}
- -
- al = al->next; HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
} -
- while (al != audit_list->next); - /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */
- while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
/* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already - if (p[0] != '\0'
have two objects loaded. */ - && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
@@ -1715,7 +1797,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n", - || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
if (tcbp == NULL) - npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
tcbp = init_tls (); -
+ npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
- if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL)) HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
+ if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init)) HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
/* Initialize security features. But only if we have not done it HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
earlier. */
security_init ();
@@ -2346,9 +2428,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
char *p;
while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
- if (p[0] != '\0'
- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
{
/* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc. The
memory can never be freed. */
@@ -2412,7 +2492,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
break;
}
if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
- process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
+ audit_list_string = &envline[6];
break;
case 7:
-- --
2.9.3 2.9.3

280
gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch
View file

@ -1,124 +1,206 @@
From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
patch from: patch from:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9
--- ---
ChangeLog | 7 ++++++ ChangeLog | 11 +++++++
elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644 index 86ae20c..65647fb 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c --- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c +++ b/elf/rtld.c
@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local @@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard) return *p != '\0';
#endif }
+/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker, -/* List of auditing DSOs. */
+ particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active. */ +/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the
+#ifdef NAME_MAX + audit_list below. */
+# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX +const char *audit_list_string;
+#else
+# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
+#endif
+#ifdef PATH_MAX
+# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
+#else
+# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
+#endif
+ +
+/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain +/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs. audit_list->next is the first
+ directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names + element. */
+ unconditionally. */
+static bool
+dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+{
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
+ {
+ /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
+ programs, and also skip overlong names. */
+ size_t len = strlen (p);
+ if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
+ return false;
+ }
+ return *p != '\0';
+}
/* List of auditing DSOs. */
static struct audit_list static struct audit_list
@@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro; {
/* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */ const char *name;
static int version_info attribute_relro; struct audit_list *next;
} *audit_list;
+/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries +/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list. */
+ separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the +struct audit_list_iter
+ executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
+ (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
+ ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads
+ performed. */
+unsigned int
+handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
+{ +{
+ unsigned int npreloads = 0; + /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL. */
+ const char *p = preloadlist; + const char *audit_list_tail;
+ char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
+ +
+ while (*p != '\0') + /* The list element returned in the previous iteration. NULL before
+ { + the first element. */
+ /* Split preload list at space/colon. */ + struct audit_list *previous;
+ size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
+ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
+ {
+ memcpy (fname, p, len);
+ fname[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ fname[0] = '\0';
+ +
+ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */ + /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
+ p += len; + audit_list_string. */
+ if (*p != '\0') + char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];
+ ++p; +};
+ +
+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname)) +/* Initialize an audit list iterator. */
+ npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD"); +static void
+ } +audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
+ return npreloads; +{
+ iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
+ iter->previous = NULL;
+} +}
+ +
static void +/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list. */
dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr, +static const char *
ElfW(Word) phnum, +audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
@@ -1464,23 +1529,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n", +{
+ if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
+ {
+ /* First iterate over audit_list_string. */
+ while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
+ {
+ /* Split audit list at colon. */
+ size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
+ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))
+ {
+ memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
+ iter->fname[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ /* Do not return this name to the caller. */
+ iter->fname[0] = '\0';
+
+ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
+ iter->audit_list_tail += len;
+ if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
+ ++iter->audit_list_tail;
+
+ /* If the name is valid, return it. */
+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
+ return iter->fname;
+ /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name. */
+ }
+ /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list. */
+ }
+
+ if (iter->previous == NULL)
+ {
+ if (audit_list == NULL)
+ /* No pre-parsed audit list. */
+ return NULL;
+ /* Start of audit list. The first list element is at
+ audit_list->next (cyclic list). */
+ iter->previous = audit_list->next;
+ return iter->previous->name;
+ }
+ if (iter->previous == audit_list)
+ /* Cyclic list wrap-around. */
+ return NULL;
+ iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
+ return iter->previous->name;
+}
+
#ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
/* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs. This
@@ -1305,11 +1383,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL)) /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now. */
- if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
+ bool need_security_init = true;
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
+ || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
{ {
- /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries - /* Iterate over all entries in the list. The order is important. */
- separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
- executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope - struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
- list. If the binary is running setuid all elements + struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
- containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */ + audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
- char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
- char *p; /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
initialize the data structures now. */
@@ -1320,9 +1400,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
fail later on. */
security_init ();
+ need_security_init = false;
- do
+ while (true)
{
+ const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
+ if (name == NULL)
+ break;
+
int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
/* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set. The reason is that we know
glibc will use the static model. */
struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
- dlmargs.fname = al->name;
+ dlmargs.fname = name;
dlmargs.map = NULL;
const char *objname;
@@ -1344,7 +1429,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
not_loaded:
_dl_error_printf ("\
ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
- al->name, err_str);
+ name, err_str);
if (malloced)
free ((char *) err_str);
}
@@ -1448,10 +1533,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
goto not_loaded;
}
}
- -
HP_TIMING_NOW (start); - al = al->next;
- }
- /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */ - while (al != audit_list->next);
- while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
- if (p[0] != '\0' /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1) have two objects loaded. */
- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL)) @@ -1715,7 +1797,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
- npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD"); if (tcbp == NULL)
- tcbp = init_tls ();
+ npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
HP_TIMING_NOW (stop); - if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop); + if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff); /* Initialize security features. But only if we have not done it
earlier. */
security_init ();
@@ -2346,9 +2428,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
char *p;
while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
- if (p[0] != '\0'
- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
{
/* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc. The
memory can never be freed. */
@@ -2412,7 +2492,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
break;
}
if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
- process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
+ audit_list_string = &envline[6];
break;
case 7:
-- --
2.9.3 2.9.3

23
gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
Copied from Debian.
2017-06-14 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
* sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c: Add IS_IN (libc) guard.
* sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c: Likewise.
--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
+++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
-#define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
+#if IS_IN (libc)
+# define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
+# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
+#endif
--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
+++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
+#if IS_IN (libc)
+# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
+#endif