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d841a292b2
* gnu/packages/ssh.scm (openssh)[source]: Add patches openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch, openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch, openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch. * gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch: New file. * gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch: New file. * gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register them.
111 lines
3.8 KiB
Diff
111 lines
3.8 KiB
Diff
From dde63f7f998ac3812a26bbb2c1b2947f24fcd060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 13:49:44 +1000
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Subject: Mitigate timing of disallowed users PAM logins.
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When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and
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it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for
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the failure is not noticeably different whether or not the password
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is correct. This behaviour can be detected by sending a very long
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password string which is slower to hash than the fake password.
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Mitigate by constructing an invalid password that is the same length
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as the one from the client and thus takes the same time to hash.
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Diff from djm@
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Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946
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Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902
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Last-Update: 2016-07-22
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Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-2.patch
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---
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auth-pam.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
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1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
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index 8425af1..abd6a5e 100644
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--- a/auth-pam.c
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+++ b/auth-pam.c
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@@ -232,7 +232,6 @@ static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
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static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
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static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
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static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
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-static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
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/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
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#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
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@@ -810,12 +809,35 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
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return (-1);
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}
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+/*
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+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
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+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
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+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
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+ */
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+static char *
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+fake_password(const char *wire_password)
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+{
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+ const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
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+ char *ret = NULL;
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+ size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
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+
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+ if (l >= INT_MAX)
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+ fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
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+
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+ ret = malloc(l + 1);
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+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
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+ ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
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+ ret[i] = '\0';
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+ return ret;
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+}
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+
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/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
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static int
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sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
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{
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Buffer buffer;
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struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
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+ char *fake;
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debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
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switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
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@@ -836,8 +858,11 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
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(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
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options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
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buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
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- else
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- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
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+ else {
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+ fake = fake_password(*resp);
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+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake);
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+ free(fake);
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+ }
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if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
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buffer_free(&buffer);
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return (-1);
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@@ -1181,6 +1206,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
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{
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int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
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PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
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+ char *fake = NULL;
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if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
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fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
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@@ -1196,7 +1222,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
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*/
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if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
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options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
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- sshpam_password = badpw;
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+ sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
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sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
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(const void *)&passwd_conv);
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@@ -1206,6 +1232,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
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sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
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sshpam_password = NULL;
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+ free(fake);
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if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
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debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
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authctxt->user);
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