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e7806e6caa
* gnu/packages/backup.scm (libarchive)[replacement]: New field. (libarchive/fixed): New variable. * gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2016-1541.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
67 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
67 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
Fix CVE-2016-1541 (buffer overflow zip_read_mac_metadata)
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Taken from upstream source repository:
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https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/d0331e8e5b05b475f20b1f3101fe1ad772d7e7e7
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When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
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without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
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to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
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the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
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and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
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an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
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the end of the allocated buffer.
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This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
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manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
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handling this type of entry:
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1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
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abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
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data sizes do not match.
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2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
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abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
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size is larger than 4MB.
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3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
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size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
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entry size.
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---
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libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c | 13 +++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c
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index 0f8262c..0a0be96 100644
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--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c
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+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c
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@@ -2778,6 +2778,11 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
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switch(rsrc->compression) {
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case 0: /* No compression. */
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+ if (rsrc->uncompressed_size != rsrc->compressed_size) {
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+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
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+ "Malformed OS X metadata entry: inconsistent size");
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+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
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+ }
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#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
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case 8: /* Deflate compression. */
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#endif
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@@ -2798,6 +2803,12 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
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(intmax_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size);
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return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
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}
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+ if (rsrc->compressed_size > (4 * 1024 * 1024)) {
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+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
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+ "Mac metadata is too large: %jd > 4M bytes",
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+ (intmax_t)rsrc->compressed_size);
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+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
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+ }
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metadata = malloc((size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size);
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if (metadata == NULL) {
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@@ -2836,6 +2847,8 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
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bytes_avail = remaining_bytes;
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switch(rsrc->compression) {
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case 0: /* No compression. */
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+ if ((size_t)bytes_avail > metadata_bytes)
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+ bytes_avail = metadata_bytes;
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memcpy(mp, p, bytes_avail);
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bytes_used = (size_t)bytes_avail;
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metadata_bytes -= bytes_used;
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