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guix/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
Leo Famulari 9c4a8514d6
gnu: openssl: Fix CVE-2016-2177 and CVE-2016-2178. 
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
* gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl/fixed): Use them.
2016-06-15 10:48:13 -04:00

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Fix CVE-2016-2177.
<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2177>
Source:
<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7>
From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
A common idiom in the codebase is:
if (p + len > limit)
{
return; /* Too long */
}
Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
limit == p + SIZE
"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
message).
The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
undefined behaviour.
For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2177
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
---
ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
- if (p + j > d + n) {
+ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* cookie stuff */
- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
+ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = *(p++);
- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
+ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
}
- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
+ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
+ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* compression */
i = *(p++);
- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
+ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index b182998..54ee783 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
int r;
#endif
- if (session_id + len > limit) {
+ if (limit - session_id < len) {
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index fb64607..cdac011 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
- if (data >= (limit - 2))
+ if (limit - data <= 2)
return;
data += 2;
- if (data > (limit - 4))
+ if (limit - data < 4)
return;
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
- if (data + size > limit)
+ if (limit - data < size)
return;
data += size;
@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
+ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
} else {
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- if (data + len != limit)
+ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
if (data == limit)
goto ri_check;
- if (data > (limit - 2))
+ if (limit - data < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, len);
- if (data + len != limit)
+ if (limit - data != len)
goto err;
- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
- if (data + size > (limit))
+ if (limit - data < size)
goto err;
# if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
return 1;
- if (data >= limit - 2)
+ if (limit - data <= 2)
return 1;
n2s(data, len);
- if (data > limit - len)
+ if (limit - data < len)
return 1;
- while (data <= limit - 4) {
+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
- if (data + size > limit)
+ if (limit - data < size)
return 1;
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
# endif
- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
goto ri_check;
n2s(data, length);
- if (data + length != d + n) {
+ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
+ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
- if (data + size > (d + n))
+ if ((d + n) - data < size)
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
i = *(p++);
- p += i;
- if (p >= limit)
+
+ if (limit - p <= i)
return -1;
+
+ p += i;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
- p += i;
- if (p >= limit)
+ if (limit - p <= i)
return -1;
+ p += i;
+
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
- p += i;
- if (p > limit)
+ if (limit - p < i)
return -1;
+ p += i;
+
/* Now at start of extensions */
- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
+ if (limit - p <= 2)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
+ while (limit - p >= 4) {
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
- if (p + size > limit)
+ if (limit - p < size)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
int r;
--
2.8.4
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